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Abstract
In asymmetric information models of financial markets, prices imperfectly reveal the private
information held by traders. Informed insiders thus have an incentive not only to trade less
aggressively but also to manipulate the market by trading in the wrong direction and under-
taking short term losses, so as to ‘confuse’ the market and increase the noise in the trading
process. In this paper we show that when the market faces uncertainty about the existence of
the insider in the market and when there is a large number of trading periods before all private
information is revealed, long-lived informed traders will manipulate in every equilibrium.
1 Introduction
In asymmetric information models of financial markets, prices imperfectly reveal the private
information held by traders. An informed trader is thus hurt precisely because his trading
partially reveals the private information that allowed him to trade profitably in the first place.
Kyle (1985) shows that informed insiders strategically choose to trade less aggressively in a
situation where their trading affects the equilibrium price than in the situation where it does
not. In other words, the absolute value of the informed trader’s position on an asset is likely
to be smaller in a strategic context when the insider is informationally large in the market.
However, in the linear equilibrium of Kyle’s model, the informed trader’s trading strategy is
monotonic in his information in the sense that he buys the asset when the asset is undervalued
given his information (i.e., when the value of the asset given his information is more than
the (expected) price in the market for buying the asset), and sells the asset when the asset is
overvalued (when the value of the asset given his information is less than the (expected) price
in the market for selling the asset). To quote from Kyle (1985), the unique linear equilibrium
of the model, “rules out a situation in which the insider can make unbounded profits by first
destabilizing prices with unprofitable trades made at the nth auction, then recouping the losses
and much more with profitable trades at future auctions” (p. 1323).
In this paper we consider precisely this kind of manipulative strategic trading by informed
insiders. In a dynamic setting, not only might informed traders want to hide their trades
by trading less aggressively, they might also find it in their interest to confuse other market
participants by trading in the “wrong” direction for short–term losses but long–term profits.
For example, an insider who knows that the prospects of a certain asset are not good might
actually start buying the asset in order to drive its price up and then sell it without its price
falling too fast.
We investigate this possibility of manipulative trading in a Glosten–Milgrom type of bid-ask
model1 where, in every period, competitive market makers first post bid and ask prices and
then the trader trades, so that the trader knows the price at which any order submitted in that
period will be executed. We show that when the market faces uncertainty about the existence
of an informed trader in the market, and when the number of periods of trading before all
private information is revealed is sufficiently long, every equilibrium involves manipulation by
the informed trader. We also provide a three–period simplified example of the model, where
1In Chakraborty and Yılmaz (2001) we prove the identical result for a Kyle type of market order model.
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the equilibrium involves manipulation.
We prove our result by obtaining a bound on the number of periods of trading, above
which all equilibria must necessarily be manipulative. While this bound depends on the prior
probability of noise trading in the market, it is independent of the precise specification of noise
trader strategies, allowing in particular for history dependent strategies.
Manipulative trading benefits the trader whenever he is informed — his profits are higher
than the benchmark where he is replaced by many short-lived informed traders, who buy when
they have good news and sell when they have bad news. Since market makers earn zero
expected profits, the gains of the informed trader are transformed into losses for the noise
traders. By creating liquidity, manipulation by one type of the informed trader makes prices
less informative and less responsive to trades and so reduces the adverse selection pressure on
all types of informed traders, thereby increasing their profits.
In Section 1.1, we discuss and relate this paper to the literature on manipulation. In Sections
2 and 3, we introduce a simple bid-ask model in the spirit of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and
prove that, when information is sufficiently long-lived, in every equilibrium, some type of the
informed trader will manipulate. In Section 4, we provide a simple three–period example that
illustrates our result. Section 5 concludes and the Appendix contains some of the proofs.
1.1 Review of the Literature
The seminal paper on strategic trading by an informed insider with long-lived private informa-
tion is by Kyle (1985). Kyle demonstrates the existence of a unique linear equilibrium where
the insider trades in the direction of his information. In our bid–ask model we show that the
dynamic trading strategy of the insider is very different from that in Kyle’s model as it involves
manipulation. Chakraborty and Yılmaz (2001) consider a discrete Kyle–type of market order
version of our model and show that the identical result on the necessity of manipulation for
long horizons obtains in that model as well.
A number of other authors have considered the definition and possibility of manipulation.
Jarrow (1992) formulates sufficient conditions for manipulation to be unprofitable. These suf-
ficient conditions are properties of the “reduced-form” price function.2 We set up a model
of strategic trading where equilibrium prices at each date are equal to the expected value of
2A reduced–form price function is one in which the response of the market to the large trader’s trades has
already been incorporated, so that it is a function only of the large trader’s trades.
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the asset being traded, given the market’s expectations about the insider’s strategy. How-
ever, whereas Jarrow looks at manipulation by an uninformed trader, in this paper we look at
informed manipulation.
Allen and Gale (1992) propose a classification scheme for models of manipulation. They
also provide a model of strategic trading in which some equilibria involve manipulation. Using
the classification scheme proposed by Allen and Gale, both our model and their model are
examples of pure trade–based manipulation, where the informed trader does not announce any
information (information–based manipulation) or take any actions (action–based manipula-
tion), except for those that involve trading the asset. However, unlike our model, they consider
manipulation by an uninformed trader. In their model, manipulation by the informed trader is
not profitable, although manipulation by an uninformed trader is profitable in the presence of
certain restrictions on the strategy of the informed trader.
Allen and Gorton (1992) also consider a model of pure trade-based uninformed manipulation
in which an asymmetry in buys and sells in noise traders’ trades creates the possibility of
manipulation. In every equilibrium of their model, the uninformed manipulator makes zero
profits.
Brunnermeier (2000) considers manipulation in a Kyle-type of market order model. Since
an informed trader, apart from possessing private information about the fundamentals, also
has private information regarding (a) the extent to which his information is already reflected
in the current price and (b) future public announcements about the fundamentals, he has an
incentive to trade very aggressively early on, and then partially unwind his position later for
speculative profits. Brunnermeier’s work is different from the present paper (as well as from
a number of other papers in the literature) because it does not rely on the possibility of the
insider’s trades being revealed to the market. On the contrary, it utilizes the fact that the
insider has better information about his own trades than does the market and also the fact
that an informed trader’s private information about the asset is also an imperfect signal of any
future public announcement about the value of the asset. However manipulation, in the sense
of undertaking trades that involve short-term losses, does not occur in Brunnermeier.
Kumar and Seppi (1992), in a situation with multiple risky assets, show how an uninformed
trader makes profits when an information event takes place. The manipulator, by a sequence of
trades in the spot and futures markets, is able to profit knowing that informed traders are about
to trade based on the private information they receive. This example requires a “cash-settled”
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futures contract along with the underlying asset. Kyle (1984) presents another model of market
manipulation in futures markets: a large trader can undetectably acquire a large position and
then manipulate by implementing a profitable squeeze.
There are a number of papers that consider the nature and possibility of non–trade–based
manipulation. Benabou and Laroque (1992) consider an information–based, reputational model
of manipulation in which an insider sometimes tells the truth to build a reputation and some-
times lies and profitably manipulates. Both Benabou and Laroque and the present paper are
therefore related to the large literature on reputation in repeated games. However, there are at
least two important differences. First, Benabou and Laroque allow for costless messages with
which the manipulator builds (or loses) a reputation, while they assume that the insider is a
price-taker and can trade without being detected so that only his announcements (but not his
trades) affect prices. In contrast, we do not consider the possibility of messages — the only way
that the manipulator can build a reputation is by undertaking potentially costly (or profitable)
trades. Second, Benabou and Laroque consider a situation where the private information about
the asset is revealed at the end of every period so that the only reputation to build is that about
the rationality of the dynamic trader. In contrast, in our model the private information of the
asset is not revealed till the end of play so that the updating process is not only on the type
(rationality) of the dynamic trader but also on the underlying value of the asset.
Bagnoli and Lipman (1996) develop a model of action–based manipulation where the ma-
nipulator pools with someone who can take an action that alters the value of the firm. In their
model, the manipulator takes a position, announces a takeover bid, and then unwinds his po-
sition. Vila (1989) presents another model of action-based manipulation; here the manipulator
pools with someone who buys stock prior to a takeover bid in which the value of the firm will
be increased.
The literature on manipulation and disclosure laws explicitly considers the effect of the
insider’s trades being directly revealed to the market, owing to the presence of mandatory dis-
closure laws. Fishman and Hagerty (1995) provide a one-period equilibrium model of profitable
manipulation when an uninformed insider successfully misleads the market into thinking he is
informed. The profitable opportunity arises owing to the mandatory disclosure of the insider’s
trades. John and Narayanan (1997) and Huddart, Hughes and Levine (2001) also look at the
effect of mandatory disclosure laws on the insider’s incentive to manipulate.
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2 The Model
We consider a market for one risky asset.3 The long-term return or the fundamental value of the
asset, v, is not known to all participants in the market. In particular, we assume v ∈ V ≡ {0, 1},
with the prior probability that v = 1 equal to λ ∈ (0, 1).
One trader with private information repeatedly trades the asset. In each period, competitive
uninformed market makers post bid and ask prices, equal to the expected value of the asset
conditional on the observed history of trades in equilibrium. The trader trades at those prices
(possibly choosing not to trade). Trading happens for T successive periods after which all
private information is revealed.
The private information or type of the trader is denoted by θ ∈ Θ ≡ {0, 1, N}. When θ = 0,
the trader is informed and knows that the value of the asset is v = 0. When θ = 1, the trader
is informed and knows that the value of the asset is v = 1. When θ = N, the trader is a noise
trader and his trading is driven by exogenous (e.g., liquidity) motives. The existence of this
last type of trader is meant to capture the notion that the market faces uncertainty regarding
the existence of an informed trader who trades on the basis of his information.4 Although there
are three types of the trader, only one is actually chosen by nature for any given play of the
game. We suppose that the prior distribution of θ is specified by
Pr[θ = 0 | v = 0] = Pr[θ = 1 | v = 1] ≡ µ ∈ (0, 1), (1)
while
Pr[θ = N | v = 0] = Pr[θ = N | v = 1] ≡ 1− µ. (2)
That is, with probability µ, all the trades have been submitted by the informed trader (whose
trades are correlated with the fundamental value of the asset); while with probability 1 − µ,
all the trades have been submitted by a noise trader (whose trades are uncorrelated with the
fundamental value of the asset).
Let t = 0, 1, ..., index time. The timing structure of the T -period trading game is as follows:
1. At date 0, nature chooses v and θ. The trader observes θ .
3We also assume that there is one riskless asset whose gross rate of return is normalized to 1.
4In the model that we develop here (with only one trader) the existence of the type θ = N is also necessary
for profitable trade, and it prevents the market from collapsing.
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2. In successive periods indexed by t = 1, ..., T, having observed the trades and prices up to
date t − 1, the competitive market makers post a price for each possible trade, and the
trader chooses his trade (possibly not trading).
3. In period T + 1, the realization of v is publicly disclosed.
Prices, Strategies and Payoffs In each period, the trader can submit a demand equal
to a buy order of size 1, or a sell order of size 1 or can choose not to trade. Let E = {−1, 0, 1}
denote the set of possible trades that can occur in any period, with e its generic element. Thus,
e = 1 denotes a buy order, e = −1 a sell order and e = 0, no trade. The restriction to unit-sized
buy and sell orders is purely for simplicity, and all results generalize to the case where a finite
number of possible trade sizes can be submitted. Let Et denote the t–fold Cartesian product
of E; this is the set of possible t–period histories of trades. Let et denote the generic element
{e1, ..., et} of Et. Given a t–period history of trades et, we will denote the (t+1)–period history
that is generated by a (t+1)–th period trade et+1 as {et, et+1}. Let E0 the null history of trades
with e0 its unique element. Denote by ∆(E), the set of probability distributions on E.
In every period t, market makers post an ask price and a bid price. The trader can choose
to buy the asset at the ask price or sell the asset at the bid price or choose not to trade. Let p1,t
be the ask price posted in period t and p−1,t, the bid price.5 Let pt ≡ (p1,t, p−1,t) ∈ P ≡ [0, 1]2.
Denote by P t the set of possible t–period histories of bid and ask prices (i.e., the t–fold product
of P ) with pt denoting its generic element. Denote by P 0 the null history of prices with p0 its
unique element.
Let H t = (P × E)t denote the set of t–period histories of prices and trades, with ht its
generic element. Let H0 be the null history set with h0 its unique element. Given a history
ht, the (t + 1) period history generated by prices pt+1 and a trade et+1 will be denoted as
{ht, pt+1, et+1}. Let e(ht) be the history of trades associated with the t–period history ht ∈ H t
of trades and prices, t = 0, ..., T. Finally, let H = ∪T−1t=0 H t.
For each type of the trader, a trading strategy specifies a probability distribution over trades
in period t + 1, given an observed history of past prices and trades ht, as well as the ask and
bid prices pt+1 that are posted in period t + 1. A strategy for the trader is thus defined as a
function σ : H×P → ∆(E). Let σ(e |ht, pt+1) be the probability that σ assigns to action e given
5It will be notationally convenient to define pe,t for all trades e ∈ E. In what follows, we will adopt the
innocuous convention that p0,t ≡ 0 for all t.
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a history ht and (t+ 1)–th period prices pt+1, and let σ(h
t, pt+1) be the trio {σ(e|ht, pt+1)}e∈E.
Denote by Σ the set of trading strategies for the trader. Each possible type θ ∈ Θ of the trader
chooses a trading strategy in Σ. We will denote by σθ ∈ Σ, the trading strategy chosen by type
θ of the trader.
In our model σN is exogenous, and we impose the following two conditions on it:
1. ∃ c > 0 s.t. mine∈E σN(e |ht, pt+1) > c for all ht ∈ H, pt+1 ∈ P , t = 0, ..., T − 1.
2. For all ĥt, h˜t ∈ H, such that e(ĥt) = e(h˜t), σN(ĥt, pt+1) = σN(h˜t, pt+1) for all pt+1.
(N)
The first condition states that when θ = N, the trader buys, sells, and does not trade with
probability bounded away from zero for all histories. It is necessary to prevent profitable
trading from stopping after some histories. The second condition states that σN is independent
of current and past prices, although it could depend on the history of trades.6
A price rule is defined as a function p : H → P specifying a bid and an ask price that
will be posted by the market makers after every history. Denote by p1(h
t), the ask price and
p−1(ht) the bid price that is chosen in period (t+1) after ht ∈ H. Let P = {p |p : H → P} be
the set of possible price rules.
Given a price rule p ∈ P, we define the set of t–period histories that are consistent with p,
inductively as follows:
H t(p) ≡H t−1(p)× {p(ht−1)|ht−1 ∈ H t−1(p)}×E, t = 1, ..., T, (3)
with H0(p) =H0. Note that given any price rule p, the set H t(p) allows for all possible t–period
histories of trades et ∈ Et to occur, but does not allow for past prices that are different from
those chosen according to the rule p.
The one period payoff of the informed type θ ∈ {0, 1} of the trader from any trade e at
any transaction price p̂ is (θ − p̂)e. The informed types of the trader maximize the expected
undiscounted sum of their per–period profits. For any strategy σθ, and a price rule p, let
Ut(θ, σθ,p |ht−1, pt) be the expected continuation payoff for type θ ∈ {0, 1} of the informed
trader, at the beginning of period t = 1, ..., T, given a history ht−1 ∈ H t−1, and given the
period t posted prices pt ∈ P . Let Wt(θ, σθ,p |ht) be the expected continuation payoff for type
θ ∈ {0, 1} of the informed trader, at the end of period t = 1, ..., T, given a history ht ∈ H t,
before the informed trader sees the prices posted in period t+ 1.
6Notice that these restrictions on σN still allow for noise trading strategy that is standard in the literature.
See O’Hara (1995).
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The functions Ut and Wt are recursively defined as follows:
WT (θ, σθ,p |hT ) ≡ 0 for all hT ∈ HT , (4)
Ut(θ, σθ,p |ht−1, pt) ≡
∑
e∈E
σθ(e|ht−1, pt)
[
(θ − pe,t)e+Wt(θ, σθ,p |{ht−1, pt, e})
]
, (5)
for all ht−1 ∈ H t−1, pt ∈ P and t = 1, ..., T ; and,
Wt(θ, σθ,p |ht) ≡ Ut+1(θ, σθ,p |ht,p(ht)) for all ht ∈ H t, t < T. (6)
Expression (4) is a boundary condition. Expression (5) states that the expected payoff in period
t, given a history ht−1 and period t posted prices pt (that are not necessarily equal to p(ht−1)),
is equal to the expected value of the t–th period trade at the prices pt plus the expected end
of period payoff given that a t–period history {ht−1, pt, e} has occurred. Expression (6) states
that the informed trader’s end of period t expected payoff is computed given that the prices in
the next period will equal p(ht). Starting with (4) and then successively working through (5)
and (6) backwards in time, an expected continuation payoff is specified for every decision node
ht−1 ∈ H t−1, pt ∈ P, for each type θ ∈ {0, 1}, strategy σθ and price rule p.
Equilibrium In our definition of equilibrium, we directly impose the notion that the
market makers face competition and choose prices to equal the expected value of the asset
conditional on the observed history of trades up to and including the trade in that period.
Given such competitive pricing, equilibrium also requires that type θ ∈ {0, 1} of the informed
trader chooses a strategy σθ that maximizes his expected payoff after every history.
Definition 1 An equilibrium is a triple {σ0, σ1,p} such that the following hold.
1. The informed types’ strategies are sequentially rational given p: for all θ ∈ {0, 1}, for all
t ∈ {1, ..., T}, histories ht−1 ∈ H and prices pt ∈ P,
σθ ∈ argmax
σ∈Σ
Ut(θ, σ,p |ht−1, pt).
2. The price rule p is competitive along consistent histories: for all t ∈ {1, ..., T} and histories
ht−1 ∈ H t−1(p),
pe(h
t−1) = E[v|ht−1, et = e] for all e ∈ {−1, 1},
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The expectation in Definition 1 is derived using the priors λ and µ, the noise trader strategy
σN as well as the equilibrium strategies σ0 and σ1 used by the informed types of the traders.
Since σN satisfies condition (N), the expectation is well–defined for all histories consistent with
p. Our definition of equilibrium is equivalent to that used elsewhere in the literature (e.g.,
Glosten and Milgrom (1985)). We require the informed trader’s strategy to be sequentially
rational after every history, whether or not a such a history is consistent with prices being
chosen according to the rule p. In contrast, our equilibrium notion imposes competitive pricing
only for those histories that are consistent with p, with prices being completely unrestricted
otherwise. This is weaker than requiring competitive pricing not only on the path of play,
but also for histories where prices have not been chosen competitively in the past. We show
below that requiring competitive pricing only for consistent histories (together with sequential
rationality) is enough to rule out non-manipulative equilibria for large T .
Manipulative Strategies An informed trader, when selecting his trade in any period,
must balance the short–term profit from the trade with the long–term effect his trade has on
future prices and hence on future profits. We say that a strategy is manipulative if it involves
the informed trader undertaking a trade in any period that yields a strictly negative short-term
profit. If such a strategy is used in equilibrium, then it must be to manipulate the market
prices, which will enable him to recoup the short term losses (and more) in the future.
Definition 2 Given a price rule p, a strategy σ ∈ Σ is non–manipulative for type θ ∈ {0, 1}
if, for all t = 1, ..., T, ht−1 ∈ H t−1(p), e ∈ {−1, 1},
σ(e |ht−1,p(ht−1)) > 0⇒ [θ − pe(ht−1)]e ≥ 0.
Otherwise σ is manipulative for θ.
Note that this definition of non-manipulative strategies implies a joint restriction on the
strategy of the informed trader and the price rule.7 For any price rule p, let Σnmθ (p) be the set
of non–manipulative strategies for type θ ∈ {0, 1} and let
Σnm(p) = Σnm0 (p)× Σnm1 (p) ⊂ Σ× Σ (7)
7To see this note that when p−1(ht−1) is equal to 1 for all ht−1 ∈ Ht−1(p), t = 1, ..., T , all strategies for
type θ = 1 are non–manipulative. On the other hand if p−1(ht−1) < 1 for some ht−1 ∈ Ht−1(p), then a
non–manipulative strategy for type θ = 1 would prescribe not selling after ht−1 given pt = p(ht−1).
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be the set of pairs of non-manipulative strategies, one for each type.
We will show below that in any equilibrium, the price pe(h
t−1) ∈ (0, 1) for all e ∈ {−1, 1} and
ht−1 ∈ H t−1(p), as a direct consequence of assumption (N) and the definition of equilibrium.
For such prices, note that the conditions needed for the strategy of the informed trader to
qualify as non–manipulative are very weak. For example, not buying with probability 1, even
if the price is lower than its expected value is not considered manipulative for type θ = 1:
choosing the timing of trading is not manipulative. Consequently, the myopic or one-shot
optimal behavior of always buying with good news and always selling with bad news is not
the only possible non–manipulative pair of strategies for types θ ∈ {0, 1}.8 Finally, note that
manipulative strategies are not necessarily mixed strategies and that mixed strategies are not
necessarily manipulative. For θ = 1, the pure strategy of selling just once and buying after that
is manipulative, and the mixed strategy of buying and not trading every period with positive
probability is non–manipulative.
3 The Main Result
In the model just described, if the private information of the dynamic trader is sufficiently long
lived (i.e., if T is sufficiently large) then every equilibrium involves manipulative trading. We
prove our result with the help of the following two lemmas.
Lemma 1 For all T, µ, λ and σN satisfying (N), an equilibrium {σ0, σ1, p} exists.
Proof. See the Appendix.2
The existence of an equilibrium in our model is not completely straightforward. We prove
existence by exploiting the finiteness of the set Et of histories of trades, with the help of trading
strategies that are independent of current and past prices.
The next lemma provides a bound on the expected payoff for each type of the informed
trader in any candidate equilibrium involving non–manipulative strategies.
Lemma 2 If {σ0, σ1, p} is an equilibrium then pe(ht−1) ∈ (0, 1) for all e ∈ {−1, 1}, ht−1 ∈
H t−1(p) and t = 1, ..., T. If in addition, (σ0, σ1) ∈ Σnm(p), then
8This would be part of the equilibrium if the dynamic trader were replaced with many identical one-period
traders. Our main result is thus stronger than the claim that the equilibrium strategy of the dynamic informed
trader will be different from that generated by many such short-lived traders.
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1. p1(h
t−1) ≥ λ ≥ p−1(ht−1) for all ht−1 ∈ H t−1(p), t = 1, ..., T, where the first (respectively,
second) inequality holds with equality if ht−1 contains at least one sell (respectively, buy);
2. the expected T–period payoffs of types θ = 1 and θ = 0 are bounded above as follows:
U1(0, σ0,p |h0,p(h0)) < k0λT,
U1(1, σ1,p |h0,p(h0)) < k1(1− λ)T,
where k0, k1 ∈ (0, 1) and do not depend on σ0, σ1 or σN .
Proof. See the Appendix.2
In an equilibrium with non–manipulative strategies, the type θ = 1 does not sell and type
θ = 0 does not buy with positive probability. Consequently, from the second condition in the
definition of equilibrium, all ask prices are weakly greater than λ and all bid prices weakly less
than λ. The important part of the last result is that the bound obtained on payoffs is uniform,
i.e., does not depend on σ0, σ1 or σN .
We can now present our main result.
Proposition 1 There exists T such that for all T > T, and any σN satisfying condition (N),
every equilibrium {σ0, σ1,p} has (σ0, σ1) /∈ Σnm(p).
Proof. Suppose that {σ0, σ1, p} is an equilibrium with (σ0, σ1) ∈ Σnm(p). From Definition
2 we obtain that type θ = 1 is not supposed to sell and type θ = 0 not supposed to buy, for
histories consistent with p.
Consider the following deviation strategy of type θ = 0: suppose that θ = 0 buys in period
1 and sells from then on. From Lemma 2, p1(h
0) ∈ (0, 1) so that the loss from the first period
buy is at most −1. Further, the prices at which θ = 0 can sell from period 2 onwards are equal
to λ. Therefore θ = 0’s t–period profit from this strategy is at least −1+λ(T −1). From Lemma
2, it is seen that there exists T = 1
1−k0
1+λ
λ
such that for all T > T, the deviation strategy above
gives higher payoffs than U1(0, σ0,p|h0,p(h0)). Since k0 does not depend on σ0, σ1 or σN , there
exists no equilibrium {σ0, σ1,p} with (σ0, σ1) ∈ Σnm(p), for any T > T and any σN satisfying
condition (N). Since an equilibrium exists by Lemma 1, this completes the proof.2
It might be asked whether the result holds when there is more than one long–lived informed
trader in the market. Intuition suggests that competition between informed traders might make
it difficult for any one trader to trade manipulatively and recoup the losses, before the other
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trader reveals the information through his trades. The general answer to this question depends
on the structure of information held jointly by the two insiders. In particular, suppose that the
types of the traders are perfectly correlated, so that either there are two informed traders (with
identical information) or none. Suppose, for simplicity, that each trader gets to trade in any
period with probability 1
2
, independent across periods, and the market maker does not know
which trader has traded in any period. One can show that in such a case, our manipulation
result goes through unchanged.9 The intuition is identical to that above. In a candidate non–
manipulative equilibrium, each trader by trading manipulatively can convince the market that
no information exists in the market. They can then trade in the future at a price equal to
the ex–ante expected value, which benefits both traders for a long horizon, compared to their
payoffs from trading non–manipulatively.
4 An Example
In this section we provide a three period example of a version of our main result. In the example,
we will rule out the no trade option and will allow traders to only buy or sell in each period.
For this case, only the strategy of buying always given good news and selling always given bad
news can be considered non-manipulative, for histories consistent with the equilibrium prices.
We assume that a noise trader buys and sells with equal probabilities for all histories and
choose µ = 0.90 and λ = 0.25. For these parameter values, prices will be quite sensitive to
trades. As a result, the informed trader of type θ = 1 will manipulate even with such a short
horizon.
We first show that non-manipulation is not an equilibrium. In any equilibrium, all bid and
ask prices along any history that can arise in equilibrium must lie in the interval (0, 1). Thus,
in a candidate non–manipulative equilibrium, type θ = 1 does not sell and type θ = 0 does
not buy, along the path of play. As a result, in such a candidate equilibrium, the first period
equilibrium bid and ask prices (equal to the expected value of the asset given the trade) are
given by:
9See Chakraborty and Yılmaz (2001).
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p−1,1 =
1
2
(1− µ)λ
1
2
(1− µ)λ+ (µ+ 1
2
(1− µ))(1− λ) = 0.017241,
p1,1 =
(µ+ 1
2
(1− µ))λ
(µ+ 1
2
(1− µ))λ+ 1
2
(1− µ)(1− λ) = 0.86364.
Similarly, along a consistent history of all buys, the next two ask prices are given by p1,2 =
0.925 and p1,3 = 0.96053. Thus, if type θ = 1 of the informed trader trades according to the
non-manipulative strategy by buying in every period, his profit will be equal to
3− 0.86364− 0.925− 0.96053 = 0.25084.
On the other hand, if he deviates and sells in the first period he makes a loss of 1− p−1,1 in the
first period. However, when he buys from the next period onwards the market puts probability
1 on the trades being driven by noise, as all histories of trades are consistent with type θ = N
trading. Thus, along the history of a sell followed by buys, the equilibrium ask prices are given
by p′1,2 = p
′
1,3 = λ = 0.25. Therefore, if he deviates and sells in the first period and then buys
in the next two, his profit will be
−1 + 0.017241 + 2(1− λ) = 0.51724.
Since this deviation is profitable for type θ = 1, there does not exist a non-manipulative
equilibrium.10
We now look for a manipulative equilibrium. We look for an equilibrium of the following
form:
σ1(1|ht−1, pt) =
{
x if t = 1 and p1 = p(h
0),
1 otherwise,
(8)
for some x ∈ (0, 1); and σ0(−1|ht−1, pt) = 1 for all ht−1, pt, t ≥ 1. In words, type 1 buys in the
first period with probability x ∈ (0, 1) and sells with probability 1 − x, given the posted first
period equilibrium prices. He buys with probability 1 otherwise, regardless of posted prices,
the past history or trades. In contrast, the informed trader of type 0 does not manipulate (sells
always) in any period, for any history and any posted price.
10It is readily checked that type 0 of the informed trader will not manipulate given the prices above and his
profit from selling always will equal 0.03 0715.
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In equilibrium, the prices must equal the expected value of the asset for every consistent
history in H t−1(p).11 Given that the informed trader trades according to the strategy above,
the equilibrium ask prices, along the consistent history of all buys, must equal
p1,t =
(xµ+ 1
2t
(1− µ))λ
(xµ+ 1
2t
(1− µ))λ+ 1
2t
(1− µ)(1− λ) ,
for t = 1, 2, 3; whereas the first period bid price will equal
p−1,1 =
((1− x)µ+ 1
2t
(1− µ))λ
((1− x)µ+ 1
2t
(1− µ))λ+ (µ+ 1
2t
(1− µ))(1− λ) .
The next two ask prices along the consistent history of a sell followed by two buys will equal,
for t = 2, 3,
p′1,t =
((1− x)µ+ 1
2t
(1− µ))λ
((1− x)µ+ 1
2t
(1− µ))λ+ 1
2t
(1− µ)(1− λ) .
In such a candidate equilibrium, type 1 must be indifferent between buying and selling in the
first period, i.e., x must be such that
3− p1,1 − p1,2 − p1,3 = 1 + p−1,1 − p′1,2 − p′1,3.
Computations indicate that such an equilibrium exists with
x ∼= 0.98357. (9)
In the table below we provide all the prices along the two 3-period consistent histories of
three buys and a sell followed by two buys, to which the strategy of type 1 attaches positive
probability.
Three buys Sell and two buys
t = 1 p1,1 = 0.86178 p−1,1 = 0.022227
t = 2 p1,2 = 0.92387 p
′
1,2 = 0.34661
t = 3 p1,3 = 0.9599 p
′
1,3 = 0.42117
The equilibrium profit from manipulating of type θ = 1 is equal to 0.25445. It can be easily
verified that selling always is a best-response of θ = 0 and that his equilibrium profit is equal
to 0.035701.
11Without loss of generality, we set p1(ht−1) = 1 and p−1(ht−1) = 0, for every inconsistent history ht−1 ∈
Ht−1\Ht−1(p), t = 1, 2, 3.
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Notice that both types of the informed trader are better off in the equilibrium, compared
to the non-manipulative benchmark case above. Type 1 of the informed trader’s profit in
equilibrium is equal to 0.25445 whereas his profit from always buying in the non-manipulative
benchmark was seen above to be equal to 0.25084, a rise of 1.44%. Since, in this example,
the non-manipulative benchmark can be understood as the case corresponding to the dynamic
informed trader being replaced by a sequence of short-lived myopic traders, this rise in the
informed trader’s profit can be interpreted as the returns to having a long-horizon. By manipu-
lating, type 1 of informed trader with a long horizon “creates his own noise” and lowers all ask
prices along the history of all buy orders, giving him higher profits. Type θ = 0, is also better
off compared to the non-manipulative benchmark. His profit in the non-manipulative bench-
mark is 0.03 0715 whereas his equilibrium profit is equal to 0.035701, a rise of 16.23%. Since
type θ = 1 manipulates, a first period sell can come from the informed trader with good news
with positive probability. The first period bid price is thus higher than in the non-manipulative
case. This raises the profits of type 0 from selling in the first and every subsequent period, even
though he does not manipulate.12
5 Conclusion
The primary contribution of this paper is to show that in Glosten–Milgrom (1985) type of
models with one insider trading repeatedly, if the number of periods is large enough, then the
equilibrium will necessarily involve manipulation, as long as the market faces uncertainty about
the existence of the informed trader. If there are enough periods of trading left to recoup his
initial losses, the insider will undertake unprofitable trades to try and build a “reputation” of
not trading on information, i.e., of being a noise trader. Manipulation endogenously creates
liquidity and raises the informed trader’s profits.
The result is robust to the precise specification of the market structure. For example,
suppose that each period the trader submits an order xt from some finite set X, but the
12In the working paper version of this paper we provide a four period example with µ = 0.9 and λ = 0.5,
where both types of the informed trader manipulate. Type 1 manipulates by selling with positive probability
in the first period, and in the second period following a first period buy. Type 0 manipulates by buying with
positive probability in the first period, and in the second period following a first period sell. Compared to the
myopic, non-manipulative benchmark, the profits of each type of the informed trader from manipulation are
higher by about 16.52%, in the four period example.
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market maker only observes ht = xt + yt where yt belongs to some finite set Y. The term yt
can be interpreted as the demand coming from noise traders, with the sum xt + yt being the
aggregate market order. This model corresponds to a discrete version of the market order
model introduced by Kyle (1985), where the trader faces uncertainty about the price at which
his trades will be executed. In such a market, if the insider deviates from a candidate non–
manipulative equilibrium by manipulating repeatedly, then this deviation will ultimately be
noticed by the market maker with probability 1, so that he will be able to trade thereafter at
the ex–ante expected price λ. In Chakraborty and Yılmaz (2001), we are able to show that this
intuition is correct, and the identical result on the necessity of manipulation for long horizons
obtains also in the market order model.
6 Appendix
Preliminaries To facilitate the proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2, we will start with defining the
notion of price–independent strategies (or, p.i.–strategies for short) and associated objects.
Let E = ∪T−1t=0 Et and Ê = E ∪ ET . A p.i.–strategy is defined as a function s : E → ∆(E),
with s(e|et) being the probability that s attaches to the trade e after a trading history et, and
s(et) = {s(e|et)}e∈E. Let S be the set of p.i.–strategies. Define the metric d : S × S → R on S
as follows:
d(s, s′) = max
et∈E
max
e∈E
| s(e|et)− s′(e|et) | . (10)
The set S is a convex, compact subset of a finite-dimensional Euclidean space with respect to
this metric.13 Thus, S × S is also convex and compact with respect to the product topology
generated from (10). Recall from condition (N) that σN can be written as a p.i.–strategy,
henceforth to be denoted by sN . We will denote by sθ ∈ S, a p.i.–strategy assigned to type
θ ∈ {0, 1} of the trader.
For all t
′ ≤ t, denote by ett′ the t′–th element of et and et′(t) the first t′ elements. Any
p.i.–strategy s ∈ S generates a probability distribution over histories of trades. For a given s,
and any et, et
′ ∈ Ê with t ≥ t′, let q(et | et′ , s) be the probability that et is generated by s given
13Since E has three elements, E is a finite set. Further, s specifies a probability, one for each element of E.
Therefore, S is a subset of a finite dimensional Euclidean space. It is compact since it is closed and bounded.
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et
′
:
q(et | et′ , s) =

1 if et
′
= et,∏t−1
t′′=t′ s(e
t
t′′+1 | et′′(t)) if t′ < t, et′(t) = et′ ,
0 otherwise.
(11)
Let Z = {z : Ê → [0, 1]} be the set of functions mapping histories of trades in Ê to the unit
interval. For a fixed sN , let v : S×S → Z be the mapping that takes a pair (s0, s1) ∈ S×S to
a function vs0,s1 ∈ Z, with vs0,s1(et) ∈ [0, 1] specifying the expected value of the asset (derived
from s0, s1 and sN), after each trading history e
t ∈ Ê. Thus,
vs0,s1(e
t) ≡ {µq(e
t | e0, s1) + (1− µ)q(et | e0, sN)}λ
(1− µ)q(et | e0, sN) + µq(et |e0, s1)λ+ µq(et | e0, s0)(1− λ) . (12)
By condition (N), the mapping v is well–defined and vs0,s1(e
t) ∈ (0, 1) for all et ∈ Ê, (s0, s1) ∈
S × S.
Finally, we define the following value–function for type θ ∈ {0, 1}. Given any (s0, s1) ∈ S×S,
for θ ∈ {0, 1}, ŝ ∈ S, t = 1, ..., T − 1, let
ut(θ, ŝ, vs0,s1 |et−1) ≡
∑
e
ŝ(e|et−1) [(θ − vs0,s1({et−1, e}))e+ ut+1(θ, ŝ, vs0,s1 |{et−1, e})] , (13)
with uT+1(θ, ŝ, vs0,s1 | eT ) ≡ 0. Observe from (11) that we can also write the value function in
(13) as follows:
ut(θ, ŝ, vs0,s1 |et−1) =
T∑
t′=t
 ∑
et
′∈Et′
q(et
′ | et−1, ŝ)[θ − vs0,s1(et
′
)]et
′
t′
 . (14)
Proof of Lemma 1 We will prove the existence of an equilibrium as follows. Fixing sN ,
we will first define a best–reply correspondence ξt : S × S ⇒ S × S for types θ ∈ {0, 1} and
show that it has a fixed point (s∗0, s
∗
1). From this fixed–point (s
∗
0, s
∗
1) and the mapping v we will
then construct strategies σ0, σ1 and a price rule p that will constitute an equilibrium.
Pick any (s0, s1) ∈ S×S. For t ≥ 1, define the correspondence ξt : S×S ⇒ S×S as follows:
ξt0(s0, s1) = {s ∈ S|s ∈ argmax
ŝ∈S
ut′(0, ŝ, vs0,s1 | et
′−1) ∀ et′−1, t ≤ t′ ≤ T}, (15)
ξt1(s0, s1) = {s ∈ S|s ∈ argmax
ŝ∈S
ut′(1, ŝ, vs0,s1 | et
′−1) ∀ et′−1, t ≤ t′ ≤ T}. (16)
17
We proceed in steps. In step 1 we show that ξ1 is a non–empty convex–valued correspondence.
In step 2 we show that it has a closed graph which, together with step 1, imply the existence
of a fixed–point (s∗0, s
∗
1). In step 3, we construct an equilibrium triple {σ0, σ1,p} from the fixed
point (s∗0, s
∗
1) and the function vs∗0,s∗1 .
Step 1 (Non-empty & convex-valued correspondence).
We show, by induction on t, that ξ1 is a non-empty, convex-valued correspondence. Pick
any history of trades eT−1 and, without loss of generality, consider the type θ = 0. Then,
uT (0, ŝ, vs0,s1 | eT−1) =
∑
e
ŝ(e|eT−1)[−vs0,s1({eT−1, e})e].
Since vs0,s1(e
T−1) ∈ (0, 1), ŝ(−1|eT−1) = 1 maximizes the last expression. Therefore, the set
ξT0 (s0, s1) is non-empty as it contains all s ∈ S with s(−1|eT−1) = 1 for all eT−1. Further,
ξT0 (s0, s1) is a convex set.
Suppose, as part of the inductive hypothesis that ξt0(s0, s1) is a non–empty convex set. We
show that then ξt−10 (s0, s1) is also a non–empty convex set. Pick any e
t−2 and s′ ∈ ξt0(s0, s1)
and let ŝ be such that
ŝ(et
′−1) = s′(et
′−1) for all et
′−1, t′ ≥ t.
Then, from (13),
ut−1(0, ŝ, vs0,s1 | et−2) =
∑
e
ŝ(e|et−2) [−vs0,s1({et−2, e})e+ ut(0, s′, vs0,s1 | {et−2, e})] . (17)
For fixed s′, the expression on the right hand side above is linear in the probabilities {ŝ(e|et−2)}e∈E.
Therefore the expression in (17) has a maximum so that the set ξt−10 (s0, s1) is non–empty. Fur-
thermore, since ξt0(s0, s1) is a convex set by the inductive hypothesis, it is immediate that
ξt−10 (s0, s1) is a convex set.
By induction, the set ξ10(s0, s1) is thus non-empty and convex. Analogously, the ξ
1
1(s0, s1) is
non-empty and convex. Since the pair (s0, s1) was arbitrary, this shows that the correspondence
ξ1 is non-empty and convex valued.
Step 2 (Closed graph and Fixed Point).
Next, we show that ξ1 has a closed graph. We begin by showing that for all et−1, the value
function ut(1, ŝ, vs0,s1 | et−1) is continuous in ŝ. From (14), this is equivalent to showing that
q(et
′|et−1, ŝ) is continuous in ŝ for all et′ , t′ ≥ t. But for a fixed T, this is immediate from (11)
and the definition of the metric in (10). Analogously, ut(0, ŝ, vs0,s1 | et−1) is continuous in ŝ for
each et−1 and t ≥ 1.
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Similarly, it is easily seen from (12) that vs0,s1(e
t) is continuous in s0 and s1 for each e
t, as
q(et|e0, s) is continuous in s. Therefore, from (13) it follows that for θ ∈ {0, 1}, ut(θ, ŝ, vs0,s1|et−1)
is continuous in s0 and s1.
To show that ξ1 has a closed graph, we want to prove the following: If (sn0 , s
n
1 , ŝ
n
0 , ŝ
n
1 ) →
(s′0, s
′
1, ŝ0, ŝ1) with (ŝ
n
0 , ŝ
n
1 ) ∈ ξ1(sn0 , sn1 ) for all n, then (ŝ0, ŝ1) ∈ ξ1(s′0, s′1). Suppose not, i.e.,
there exists a sequence as above but, without loss of generality, ŝ1 /∈ ξ11(s′0, s′1). Then there
exists t ∈ {1, ..., T}, et−1, ε > 0 and s˜ ∈ S such that
ut(1, s˜, vs′0,s′1 | et−1) > ut(1, ŝ′1, vs′0,s′1 | et−1) + 3ε.
For n large enough, by continuity, we must have
ut(1, s˜, vsn0 ,sn1 | et−1) > ut(1, s˜, vs′0,s′1 | et−1)− ε
> ut(1, ŝ1, vs′0,s′1 | et−1) + 2ε
> ut(1, ŝ
n
1 , vs′0,s′1 | et−1) + ε
> ut(1, ŝ
n
1 , vsn0 ,sn1 | et−1).
But this contradicts the fact that ŝn1 ∈ ξ11(sn0 , sn1 ) for all n.
Since S × S is compact and convex and ξ1 is a non-empty, convex-valued correspondence
with a closed graph, it has a fixed point (s∗0, s
∗
1), by the Kakutani–Fan–Glicksberg theorem.
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Step 3 (Construction of Equilibrium).
We now construct an equilibrium {σ0, σ1,p} from the fixed point (s∗0, s∗1) and vs∗0,s∗1 . We
begin by constructing the price rule p and associated consistent histories H t(p).
Let H0(p) = H0. For t = 1, ..., T, if ht−1 ∈ H t−1(p), let
pe(h
t−1) = vs∗0,s∗1({e(ht−1), e}) for all e ∈ {−1, 1},
and so define H t(p) from (3); and if ht−1 /∈ H t−1(p), let
p1(h
t−1) = 1 and p−1(ht−1) = 0.
This defines a price rule p :H → [0, 1].
For θ ∈ {0, 1} and t = 1, ..., T, let
σθ(e|ht−1, pt) = s∗θ(e|e(ht−1)) for all e ∈ E,
14See Moore (1999).
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if ht−1 ∈ H t−1(p) and pt = p(ht−1); and let
σ1(1|ht−1, pt) = 1 = σ0(−1|ht−1, pt),
otherwise. This defines a strategy σθ : H × P → ∆(E) for each type θ ∈ {0, 1}.
The triple {σ0, σ1,p} thus constructed is an equilibrium. To see this, consider the second
condition in Definition 1 first. Pick any e ∈ {−1, 1} and ht−1 ∈ H t−1(p), t = 1, ..., T . Given the
price rule p, E[v|ht−1, et = e] depends only on the relative likelihoods that the history of trades
{e(ht−1), e} has been generated by σ0, σ1 and σN (equivalently, sN) Recall that vs∗0,s∗1(et) is the
expected value of the asset given et, derived from s∗0, s
∗
1 and sN , for all e
t. By construction, σθ
generates the same probability distribution over trades as s∗θ, for θ ∈ {0, 1}, ht−1 ∈ H t−1(p)
and pt = p(h
t−1). It then follows that
E[v|ht−1, et = e] = vs∗0,s∗1({e(ht−1), e}) = pe(ht−1) for e ∈ {−1, 1}.
As for the sequential rationality condition in Definition 1, consider first histories that are
consistent with p. By construction, for all θ ∈ {0, 1}, ht−1 ∈ H t−1(p), t = 1, ..., T,
Ut(θ, σθ,p|ht−1,p(ht−1)) = ut(θ, s∗θ, vs∗0,s∗1 |e(ht−1)).
Suppose that there exists σ′ 6= σθ such that
Ut(θ, σ
′,p|ht−1,p(ht−1)) > Ut(θ, σθ,p|ht−1,p(ht−1)), (18)
for some ht−1 ∈ H t−1(p) and θ ∈ {0, 1}, so that σθ is not sequentially rational. Let s′ ∈ S be
such that s′(e|e(ht−1)) = σ′(e|ht−1,p(ht−1)) for all e ∈ E, ht−1 ∈ H t−1(p), t = 1, ..., T. Then,
Ut(θ, σ
′,p|ht−1,p(ht−1)) = ut(θ, s′, vs∗0,s∗1 |e(ht−1)),
for all ht−1 ∈ H t−1(p), t = 1, ..., T. Consequently,
ut(θ, s
′, vs∗0,s∗1 |e(ht−1)) > ut(θ, s∗θ, vs∗0,s∗1 |e(ht−1)),
for ht−1 ∈ H t−1(p) such that (18) holds, contradicting the fact that s∗θ ∈ ξ1θ(s∗0, s∗1). Thus σθ must
be sequentially rational for all histories ht−1 ∈ H t−1(p) with pt = p(ht−1), for each θ ∈ {0, 1}.
On the other hand, if pt 6= p(ht−1) or ht−1 /∈ Ht−1(p), sequential rationality of σθ is immediate,
from the construction of σθ and p.This concludes the proof of existence.2
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Proof of Lemma 2 Suppose that σ0, σ1, p is an equilibrium. Let s0, s1 ∈ S be such
that, for all ht−1 ∈ H t−1(p), t = 1, ..., T,
sθ(e|e(ht−1)) = σθ(e|ht−1,p(ht−1)) for all e ∈ E, θ ∈ {0, 1}. (19)
Then, from Definition 1 and (12), for all ht−1 ∈ H t−1(p), t = 1, ..., T,
pe(h
t−1) = vs0,s1({e(ht−1), e}) ∈ (0, 1), for all e ∈ {−1, 1}, (20)
showing that prices must lie in the interval (0, 1) in any equilibrium. Furthermore, for θ ∈ {0, 1},
Ut(θ, σθ,p|ht−1,p(ht−1)) = ut(θ, sθ, vs0,s1|e(ht−1)). (21)
Suppose now that (σ0, σ1) ∈ Σnm(p). From Definition 2 and (19) we obtain
s1(−1|e(ht−1)) = s0(1|e(ht−1)) = 0, (22)
so that from (12) and (20), we have p1(h
t−1) ≥ λ ≥ p−1(ht−1) for all ht−1 ∈ H t−1(p), t = 1, ..., T.
Further, if ht−1 contains at least one sell order (respectively, buy order), then p1(ht−1) = λ
(respectively, p−1(ht−1) = λ).
We now establish the bound on payoffs for type θ = 0. The case for θ = 1 is entirely
analogous. From (14), (20) and (21), we can write the date 0 expected profits of type θ = 0 as
U1(0, σ0,p |h0,p(h0)) =
T∑
t=1
[∑
et∈Et
q(et | e0, s0)vs0,s1(et)(−ett)
]
, (23)
where the term inside the square brackets is expected period–t profit of θ = 0.
Let
Suppt(s0) = {et ∈ Et | q(et | e0, s0) > 0},
At(s0) = {et ∈ Suppt(s0) | ett = −1},
and
A∗t (s0) = {et ∈ At(s0) | q(et | e0, s0) > q(et | e0, sN)}.
Note that either At(s0) or A
∗
t (s0) may be empty. From (20), if At(s0) is empty, then∑
et∈Et
q(et | e0, s0)vs0,s1(et)(−ett) = 0.
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So suppose that At(s0) is non–empty. Then,∑
et∈Et
q(et | e0, s0)vs0,s1(et)(−ett) =
∑
et∈At(s0)
q(et | e0, s0)vs0,s1(et)
=
∑
et∈At(s0)\A∗t (s0)
q(et | e0, s0)vs0,s1(et) +
∑
et∈A∗t (s0)
q(et | e0, s0)vs0,s1(et).
From (20) and (22), for all et ∈ At(s0),
vs0,s1(e
t) =
q(et | e0, sN)(1− µ)λ
q(et | e0, sN)(1− µ) + q(et | e0, s0)µ(1− λ) ≤ λ, (24)
with the inequality being strict if q(et | e0, s0) > 0. Furthermore, if et ∈ A∗t (s0),
vs0,s1(e
t) <
(1− µ)λ
(1− µ) + µ(1− λ) ≡ v
∗(µ, λ) < λ. (25)
Then, ∑
et∈Et
q(et | e0, s0)vs0,s1(et)(−ett)
<
∑
et∈At(s0)\A∗t (s0)
q(et | e0, s0)λ+
∑
et∈A∗t (s0)
q(et | e0, s0)v∗(µ, λ)
≤
∑
et∈At(s0)\A∗t (s0)
q(et | e0, s0)λ+ (1−
∑
et∈At(s0)\A∗t (s0)
q(et | e0, s0))v∗(µ, λ)
≤
∑
et∈At(s0)\A∗t (s0)
q(et | e0, sN)λ+ (1−
∑
et∈At(s0)\A∗t (s0)
q(et | e0, sN))v∗(µ, λ)
≤
∑
et∈At(s0)
q(et | e0, sN)λ+ (1−
∑
et∈At(s0)
q(et | e0, sN))v∗(µ, λ)
≤
∑
et∈Et−1
q(et | e0, sN)λ+ (1−
∑
et∈Et−1
q(et | e0, sN))v∗(µ, λ)
where Et−1 ≡ {et ∈ Et | ett = −1} ⊃ At(s0). The first inequality above follows from (24) and
(25) and the fact that either At(s0)\A∗t (s0) or A∗t (s0) is non–empty as At(s0) is non–empty; the
third inequality follows from the definitions of At(s0) and A
∗
t (s0); with the remaining inequalities
following from the fact that A∗t (s0) ⊂ At(s0) ⊂ Et−1 ⊂ Et and the fact that v∗(µ, λ) < λ.
Note that, by condition (N),∑
et∈Et−1
q(et | e0, sN) =
∑
et−1∈Et−1
q(et−1 | e0, sN)sN(−1|et−1) < 1− 2c ∈ (0, 1).
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Therefore, ∑
et∈Et
q(et | e0, s0)vs0,s1(et)(−ett) < k0λ,
regardless of whether At(s0) is empty or not, where k0 ≡ (1− 2c)+ 2cv∗(µ,λ)λ ∈ (0, 1). But then,
from (23), U1(0, σ0,p |h0,p(h0)) < k0λT, completing the proof.2
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